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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the relationship between female board members in publicly listed 
companies and firm financial performance. The cross-sectional data set involves 82 
publicly listed companies from Nasdaq OMX Helsinki stock exchange in year 2016. The 
study is conducted as an OLS regression analysis with board diversity as an explanatory 
variable and firm size, board size, industrial sector and performance measure at different 
time point as control variables. The empirical analysis investigates the relationship 
between Return on Asset, Return on Equity and gender diversity within the board of 
directors. 
 
This study contributes to previous literature by conducting the research on latest data from 
Finnish companies. As far as one is concerned, there are no published literature that would 
investigate the relationship between female board members and financial performance of 
the Nasdaq OMX Helsinki firms. 
 
Empirical findings of this study suggest a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between firm financial performance and board diversity. Moreover, empirical evidence 
suggests that financial performance measures of the sample firms are positively 
correlated. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The fundamental function of modern-day corporations is to create value for their 
stakeholders. This function is merely in the hands of corporate boards, who’s duty is to 
hire and fire company CEO and monitor, as well as advice, the management. One of the 
most noteworthy corporate governance issues that modern-day companies face is to 
compose an effective board of directors. Previously, policy-makers and academics 
thought that the solution to this corporate governance issue was to manage the 
independency or the objectivity of the board of directors. The general belief was that, 
directors who are independent of any conflicts of interest with the stakeholders of the 
company, are able to effectively supervise the company. However, it is not a simple task 
to measure director independence, i.e. the level of “collective independence of thought” 
and compose independent boards (Adams, 2016). Moreover, hardly any evidence 
supported the assumption that independent boards are also effective. Later findings 
suggested that, if board members are recruited based on the so-called “Old-Boys-Club” 
meaning that very little, if any, female board members are given board seats, the board is 
less likely to perform well (See e.g. Adams 2016; Adams, Hermalin & Weisbach 2010).  
 
Ever since the theory of independent boards was partially disputed by many researchers, 
academics have suggested another solution to the issue of composing effective boards; 
recruit members, who share different cultural, educational or religious views and increase 
gender diversity in the boardroom (See e.g. Carter, Simkins & Simpson 2003; Brancato 
1999). Moreover, as the workforce of western economy is becoming more diverse, 
companies meet potential candidates for managerial positions and board of directors from 
diverse backgrounds. The interest of hiring managers and directors from wider talent pool 
as well as public pressure regarding social equality have driven companies to reshape 
their managerial groups and corporate boards. Companies are suggested to diverse their 
management and compose gender-neutral board of directors. The topic of diversity in 
corporate boards has gained public attention after the reformation of national and 
international corporate governance recommendations and increased discussion on gender 
equality.   
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Recently, there has been a substantial amount of discussion in public newspapers and 
publications of national institutions regarding the composition of the board of directors 
in publicly listed companies. For example, the newspaper Helsingin Sanomat (25.7.2016) 
told about women in the boardroom of Finnish publicly listed companies in an article 
“Joka kymmenes pörssiyhtiö yhä vailla naista”. According to the report, the number of 
women in the board of directors has increased a staggering 50 per cent since 2010. Such 
a notable increase is a milestone for women in the breaking of the so-called “glass-
ceiling” which means that there is an invisible barrier that keeps women and minorities 
away from top managerial positions.  
 
During the period of this study around 10 per cent of the Nasdaq OMX Helsinki 
companies lack female representation in their board of directors. Some sources of public 
media criticize these companies of favoring men in the nomination of CEOs and other 
executive managers. An article “Vain viisi naista on pörssiyhtiön johtajana Suomessa: 
“Kehitys on ollut hidasta” by the newspaper Aamulehti (16.11.2016), reminds that 
Finnish companies still prefer men in top management for as much as in only five of the 
publicly listed companies, woman served as the CEO of the company. Moreover, the 
executive committees of the companies are still predominantly male. There has even been 
a slight decrease in the number of women in top management groups from 21,5 per cent 
in 2015 to 20 per cent in 2016 (Chamber of Commerce 16.11.2016).  
 
But why does this topic earn so much coverage in national news and corporate governance 
research?  As stated by Adams (2016), diversity is often seen as a resource for companies 
and diverse corporate boards regarded more effective than those consisting of a 
homogenous group of board members. Moreover, diversity within the board of directors 
may benefit the company in several ways. Increased diversity within the board of 
directors may be a positive signal for job applicators, attracting qualified persons outside 
the homogenous pool of job applicants. Furthermore, stakeholders often see diversity as 
an optimistic firm characteristic that could improve company’s reputation. Additionally, 
diversity within the boardroom may improve decision-making as the board of directors 
consists of a more heterogeneous group of people. (See e.g. Rose 2007; Carter et al. 
2003). Shrader, Blackburn & Iles (1997), for example, made a statement that gender 
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diversity in top management and firm performance are positively associated with each 
other. They proposed that the positive impact of women managers on financial 
performance is a result of recruiting from a more diverse talent pool. 
 
Diversity is frequently associated with creativity and innovation. Siciliano (1996), for 
example, suggested that diverse boards are associated with higher levels of social 
performance whereas Bantel (1993) stated that functional diversity in top management 
groups has a positive effect on decision-making.  All in all, plenty of studies on diversity 
issues agree with the general belief that increased diversity in the boardroom is associated 
with improved performance. This paper examines further the assumption that gender 
diversity within the board of directors is related to improved financial performance. 
 
 
 The purpose of the study 
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether female directors are associated with 
better financial performance involving evidence from the Finnish publicly listed 
companies. The study is motivated by recent discussion regarding gender diversity in the 
boardrooms and reports on tightened national recommendations with regards to gender 
equality. Additionally, motivation to this paper come from previous studies on board 
diversity and firm performance. For instance, Erhardt, Werbel & Shrader (2003) and 
Carter et al. (2003) reported that board diversity has a positive impact on firm 
performance within US firms. Furthermore, Brancato (1999) reports that diversified 
boards are associated with better corporate governance practiced by the board of directors. 
Miller & Triana (2009) find out that board diversity is positively related to innovation 
and racial diversity within the board of directors is positively associated with firm 
reputation. Both, firm reputation and innovation can be regarded as financially beneficial 
factors for companies. 
 
All in all, previous findings support the assumption that companies benefit from diverse 
boards in many ways, eventually leading to better organisational performance. Hence, it 
is worth studying if similar results betwen board diversity and financial performance can 
10 
 
be found from the Finnish markets. The ongoing discussion on gender equality in 
European countries often suggests that, by increasing diversity in top management and in 
boardrooms, leads to better financial peformance. This study provides useful information 
on, whether or not it is reasonable, in terms of profitability, for companies to improve 
gender equality in corporate boards. Moreover, the results of this paper can be used as a 
guideline for improving national recommendations and corporate governance of public 
and private institutions.  
 
Gender diversity was first acknowlished in Finnish national recommendations of 
corporate governance in 2003 after the discussion regarding effective boardrooms stepped 
up. One of the reasons for the increasing discussion was past failure of  composing 
independent and effective corporate boards with the ability to supervise companies’s 
managements succesfully. Board independence and effective decision-making can be 
obtained by increasing board diversity. Carter et al. (2003), for example argued that 
diverse boards would be able to better supervise companiess. Board independence and 
effective decision-making can be obtained by increasing board diversity. Carter et al. 
(2003), for example argued that diverse boards would be able to better supervise 
companies. International and national corporate governance codes and standards have 
changed drastically during the past two decades and many countries have already 
included a gender quota in national corporate governance regulations. In Finland, a 
recommendation on representation of women in corporate boards was first introduced in 
the corporate governance code of 2003 and has since been included in it.  
 
The study examines the relationship between return on asset (ROA), return on equity 
(ROE) and board diversity of 82 publicly listed companies from the Nasdaq OMX 
Helsinki stock exchange. The two financial performance measure, ROA and ROE, are 
described more precisely in chapter 5.1.1. Variables from the cross-sectional data set are 
applied in an OLS regression model in order to investigate the relationship between 
explanatory variable, board diversity and explained variable, ROA and ROE together 
with several control variables. As a contribution to previous literature, this study 
investigates the relationship between firm performance and women in the boardroom 
using data from Finnish publicly listed companies. As far as one is concerned, to date, 
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there are no existing literature on gender diversity and firm performance involving 
Finnish, publicly listed companies.  
 
Previous studies on gender diversity have involved a wide range of different financial 
ratios in order to measure and compare firm performance. The most common performance 
measure in diversity studies is perhaps Tobins’ Q, used by, for instance, Carter et al. 
(2003), Adams & Ferreira (2009), Rose (2007) and Campbell & Minguez-Vera (2008). 
However, this paper use ROA and ROE as the two financial performance ratios. These 
two profitability measures are previously used by Shrader et al. (1997) in a study on 
gender diversity in firm management and boardroom and link between firm performance. 
Shrader et al. (1997) argue, that ROA and ROE give a relatively good basic information 
on firm profitability. Moreover, these two performance measures are relatively easy to 
calculate and they combine financial information from firm’s income statement and 
balance sheet. As a comparison, Tobin’s Q is based on information taken merely from 
firm’s balance sheet. Erhardt et al. (2003) used firm ROA and ROI as profitability 
measures for sample firms. From shareholders point of view, it is more valuable to 
measure performance as the return on equity as it captures the ratio of company’s earnings 
on shareholder’s equity.  
 
 
 Research hypothesis 
 
Empirical analysis of this study investigates the relationship between number of women 
in the boardroom and firm financial performance. More precisely, this paper examines, if 
gender diversity in the boardroom has a positive impact on two financial ratios, ROA and 
ROE. For example, Erhardt et al. (2003), Carter et al. (2003), as well as Isidro & Sobral 
(2014) with few limitations, all reported positive relationship between the number of 
women in the board of directors and firm financial performance. Moreover, as women 
and men often present different personal characteristics across nations, educational levels 
and ages (Feingold 1994), it is plausible that they also have differing opinions on 
corporate issues. The variety of opinions relative to personal characteristics could initially 
improve decision-making within the board of directors and further lead to improved 
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financial success. Hence, the general expectation is that higher levels of board diversity 
lead to better financial performance. Based on this assumption, the following research 
hypothesis are presented: 
 
H0: Gender diversity in the boardroom is not associated with firm financial 
performance.   
 
H1: Gender diversity in the boardroom is positively related to firm financial 
performance.  
 
According to hypothesis H1, diverse boards are associated with better financial 
performance. This is in line with the findings of Erhardt et al. (2003) and Carter et al. 
(2003), who find a positive relationship between female directors and financial 
performance. The research hypothesis is tested by constructing a cross-sectional data set 
of 82 firms and conducting a correlation and regression analysis later in chapter five of 
this paper.  
 
 
 Construction of the study 
 
The study consists of six main chapters. First chapter starts with the introduction to the 
research topic and continues by discussing the purpose and motivation of the paper. 
Furthermore, research hypothesis are presented in the first chapter. Second chapter 
introduces the concept of corporate governance and corporate governance code as well 
as national and international legislation regarding publicly listed companies. Third 
chapter goes through theoretical background with regards to corporate boards and 
diversity in the board of directors. The concepts of agent theory, agency costs and director 
independence are discussed briefly. Fourth chapter introduces previous research and 
empirical findings on board diversity and women in top management. Fifth chapter 
presents the data set and research method used in the empirical analysis of this paper. 
Sixth and final chapter, followed by a short conclusion, explores empirical results and 
provides ideas for further discussion and research.  
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2. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
 
“Global market forces will sort out those companies that do not have sound corporate 
governance” 
-Mervyn King- 
 
As stated by Mervyn King, a British economist and former Governor of the Bank of 
England, internal corporate governance control is essential for companies operating in the 
modern business world. With a functioning internal control structure, companies are able 
to manage potential risks and protect shareholder’s investments. If company’s internal 
control structure collapses, the consequences are often devastating. A describing example 
of failure of internal control is the incident of Enron corporation and former accounting 
firm Arthur Andersen in the early 2000’s. The incident involved one of the largest 
accounting companies, Arthur Andersen and a large American energy company, Enron, 
which filed for bankruptcy after the incident.   
 
After the Enron and Arthur Andersen scandal, many countries tightened their law on 
accounting and national corporate governance policies. In the case of Enron, the board of 
directors and chairman of the company failed to fulfill their main duty, monitor the 
operations of the company and its management. The failure of the board of directors to 
exercise oversight enabled Enron’s employees to commit an accounting fraud by 
exaggerating company’s financial performance.  In the wake of Enron scandal, directors 
face greater demands of accountability and they are likely aware to take their roles more 
seriously. Companies choose directors more carefully and they receive tighter corporate 
governance recommendations. (Cohan 2002.)  
 
This chapter introduces the definitions of corporations, corporate governance and 
corporate behavior. Sub-chapter 2.2 discusses national legislation with regards to 
corporate governance and sub-chapter 2.3 explores Finnish corporate governance code. 
Moreover, sub-chapter 2.4 briefly introduces international legislation that affects 
corporate behavior and governance practices.  
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 Definition of corporate governance 
 
Before introducing the concept of corporate governance, it is reasonable to define the 
term corporation. Corporation is a legal entity that enables different reference groups such 
as stakeholders, employees and managers to maximize their benefit in exchange to their 
contribution for the company. Corporations are separate from their owners and have 
specific legal rights and responsibilities.  
 
Most well-known, global businesses are corporations. These include famous brands like 
Apple, Toyota Motor and Mc Donald’s. Although they all operate in different industrial 
sectors, they have few things in common. Firstly, they are all owned by shareholders and 
the shares are traded in public stock exchange. Secondly, ownership of these companies 
is separated from the management. These companies have corporate boards and executive 
officers who are responsible for management of the corporation. Moreover, shareholders 
or the owners of the corporation are not personally liable for debts.  
 
Monks & Minow (2011) defined a corporation with four main features: limited liability 
for investors, free transferability of investor interests, legal personality and centralized 
management. Limited liability for investors means that there is a separation between 
owners and employees and the risk of loss for investors is limited to the amount that each 
of the investors have invested in the company. Free transferability of company’s stocks 
enables investors to sell their shares whenever they decide to do so though they only have 
limited authority over the company. Legal personality means that corporations are 
regarded as legal entities or legal persons in law. Furthermore, registered corporations are 
owned by shareholders and publicly listed companies’ stocks are traded in stock 
exchange. Centralized management of a corporation is divided in two; board of directors 
are responsible for the overall direction of the company whereas managers take care of 
the company’s daily actions. (Monks & Minow 2011.)  
 
Corporate behavior is directed by internal actors and external mechanisms. On one hand, 
there are internal actors, responsible for company’s future direction. Key internal actors 
are shareholders, directors and executive officers. External mechanisms, on the other 
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hand, affect company’s behavior and must be taken into consideration in the decision 
making. Monks & Minow (2011) divided these external mechanisms in to three 
categories: law, the market and performance measurement.  
 
The Limited Liability Companies Act (Osakeyhtiölaki (624/2006)) and Securities Market 
Act (Arvopaperimarkkinalaki (746/2012)) are fundamental factors affecting corporations 
and governance policies in Finland. These two acts are discussed further in chapter 2.2. 
Moreover, the market and the law of supply and demand, has an impact on corporations. 
Directors and managers need to take in to consideration for example consumer purchase 
behavior, the demands from labor unions and public opinion. Firm financial performance 
affect stockholders and creditors behavior. Without the support and existence of these 
two reference groups, there would not be corporations in their modern form. Financial 
markets evaluate company’s performance and either decide to invest in the company or 
withdraw their investments from the company. Corporations are fully dependent on 
investors. Thus, it is safe to say that performance measurement is a vital external 
mechanism affecting corporate behavior.  
 
In short, corporate governance is a mixture of all the internal and external factors that 
affect management of a company. More precisely, corporate governance beholds all rules, 
practices and processes by which a firm is directed and controlled. According to Shleifer 
& Vishny (1997), corporate governance is a topic that discusses how investors can make 
a return for their investment. They state that corporate governance mechanisms are 
economic and legal institutions that are developed through political processes. These 
economic and legal institutions include for example national and international legislation, 
corporate governance code, commodity markets and stock exchanges. Altogether, 
different reference groups all have an impact on how the company is directed and 
controlled. Corporate governance is in fact a way to counterbalance stakeholders’ 
interests.   
 
Corporate boards are established to balance interest conflicts between two primary 
stakeholders of the company, that is, shareholders and managers. Without supervision, 
managers would be able to spend shareholders’ money on things that may not increase 
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shareholders’ wealth. Thus, corporate boards are crucial supervisors between the owners 
and managers of the company. Furthermore, if corporate boards are not fulfilling their 
responsibilities effectively, shareholders are not able to expel ineffective managers. 
Hence, one could say that better boards lead to, at least to some extent, better governance 
of a company.  
 
 
 National legislation on publicly listed companies 
 
Publicly listed companies are supervised carefully and corporate law sets special 
requirements to these companies. Finnish corporate law includes several acts that 
regulate, for example, composition and tasks of the board of directors and management 
of the company.  Corporate governance is regulated by the Limited Liability Company 
Act (Osakeyhtiölaki (624/2006), later OYL) and Securities Market Act 
(Arvopaperimarkkinalaki (746/2012), later AML). Moreover, the Act on Equality 
(Yhdenvertaisuuslaki (1325/2014), later YhdenvertL) and the Act on Equality Between 
Women and Men (Laki naisten ja miesten välisestä tasa-arvosta (609/1986), later Tasa-
arvoL) set requirements for corporations and influence governance policies. Moreover, 
complimentary to the provisions of the law, Securities Market Association publishes 
national Corporate Governance Code for publicly listed companies. The code is 
introduced separately in chapter 2.3. 
 
Publicly traded companies have special legal requirements which affect the operations of 
corporate boards. A publicly listed company must publish quarterly and annual reports. 
Moreover, it must have a CEO and at least three board members. Regulation of corporate 
boards in Finnish publicly listed companies is determined first and foremost by the 
Limited Liability Company Act (OYL (624/2006)). As stated in Chapter 1 § 7 (OYL), 
corporate boards shall treat all shareholders and other stakeholders equally at all times. 
Chapter 6 of the act consists of 28 sections that discusses management of corporation and 
corporate boards. Chapter 6 § 1 states that a corporation shall have a corporate board. 
Thus, all publicly listed companies are required to have a board of directors without 
exceptions.  
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Chapter 6 § 2–7 (OYL) discuss the tasks of corporate boards. In short, corporate board is 
responsible of governance, accounting and financial management of a company. 
Moreover, the opinion of the majority constitutes board decisions, that is, when more than 
half of the directors are present. A director can be disqualified from the decision-making 
if he or she would derive essential benefit and it is contrary to the interests of the company. 
Chairperson of a corporate board is responsible for organizing a board meeting when 
necessary. Minutes of the meetings shall be kept by the chairperson.  
 
Sections 8-14 discusses the requirements regarding members of the board of directors and 
the beginning and end of a membership. According to section 8, there shall be 1 to 5 
regular board members unless otherwise decided in the articles of association. The board 
of directors shall elect a chairperson if there are two or more members in the board. 
Section 9 states that board members are appointed in the general meeting or, if stated in 
the articles of association, by the supervisory board. According to section 10, there are 
few restrictions regarding the members of a corporate board. Legal persons, minors, 
persons under guardianship, persons with restricted legal competency or bankrupts cannot 
be appointed as a board member. Moreover, at least one board member shall be a resident 
of the European Economic Area unless restriction is granted by the local authority. In 
publicly listed companies, the term for a director of the corporate board shall end as the 
general meeting following the appointment of the director has come to an end unless 
otherwise stated in the articles of association (Section 11). A board member may also 
resign (Section 12) or be dismissed by the party who appointed the member (Section 13) 
and be substituted by a deputy member of the board of directors (Section 14).  
 
Sections 15–28 discuss other provisions regarding the board of directors of which sections 
17–20 discuss the general duties, provisions and appointment as well as resignation of a 
managing director.  Sections 21–24 discuss duties, provisions and membership of a 
supervisory board. The main function of the supervisory board is to supervise the 
administration of the company, i.e. supervise the actions of the board of directors and 
managing director of the company. Sections 25–28 discuss the representation of the 
company, mainly performed by the board of directors and sometimes by the managing 
director.  
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The objectives of the Act on equality between women and men (Tasa-arvoL) and act on 
equality (YhdenvertL) are to prevent discrimination of any sort, promote equality and 
improve the status of women in working life. These two acts apply to both, public and 
private companies and indirectly to the composition of board of directors. Either way, 
companies must pay attention to national legislation in gender equality matters. For 
instance, Chapter 2 § 7 (YhdenvertL) states that it is employer’s responsibility to evaluate 
and improve realization of equality in the workplace.  
 
 
 Finnish Corporate Governance Code  
 
Corporate Governance Code is a collection of recommendations for Finnish publicly 
listed companies, published and updated by the Securities Market Association. Finnish 
Securities Market Association was established in 2006 by the Confederation of Finnish 
Industries (Elinkeinoelämän Keskusliitto), NASDAQ OMX Helsinki and Finland 
Chamber of Commerce (Keskuskauppakamari). The goal of the association is to 
strengthen self-regulation of companies and participate in the preparation of self-
regulation standards for listed companies. The recommendations are intended to support 
good securities market practices, presented in the Corporate Governance Code.  
 
Corporate Governance Code consists of recommendations for the following topics: 
general meeting, board of directors, committees, managing director and other executives, 
remuneration, other governance, corporate governance reporting and remuneration 
reporting. Recommendations V–XIII of the latest Corporate Governance Code of 2016 
discuss the propositions related to the board of directors (Securities Market Association 
2016.)  
 
Recommendation V states that election of the board shall be executed in the general 
meeting of the company and according to the recommendation VI the term of office is 
one year. According to the recommendation VII company shall disclose the procedure 
applied in the preparation of the proposal for the composition of the board of directors. 
This recommendation adds transparency of the procedure. Recommendation VIII 
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contains the requirements for the composition of board. The composition should reflect 
the requirements set by the company’s operations and development stage. The director 
must have competence and enough time for all the duties. Furthermore, the number of 
directors should enable the board to accomplish all its duties. Moreover, both genders 
shall be represented in the board of directors. (Securities Market Association 2016.) 
 
As stated in the recommendation IX, company shall establish the principles regarding the 
diversity of the board. Diversity may include age, gender, occupational, educational, and 
international background.  According to the Securities Market Association, diversity of 
the knowhow, experience and opinions offers, for example, a possibility to have more 
versatile decision-making, good corporate governance and efficient management. Listed 
companies must issue an annual Corporate Governance Statement. In this statement, 
companies report their principles concerning board diversity. The statement must contain 
at least company’s objectives regarding both genders being represented in the boardroom, 
i.e. company’s goals regarding gender diversity and progress report in achieving these 
objectives.  
 
In the 2017 statement, companies must report for the first time, any deviation from the 
recommendation. This means, that companies need to explain possible lack of women or 
men in their corporate boards. Gender diversity is a topic of current interest and is widely 
discussed in the newspapers. Helsingin Sanomat (25.7.2016) for example reported that, 
while the number of women in the boardrooms of Finnish publicly listed companies has 
increased over the past years, some companies still have male directors only. Moreover, 
many companies present superficial explanations for the lack of women in the boardroom 
although, according to the recommendation, both genders should be represented in the 
board of directors.  
 
Recommendation X introduces the requirements regarding director independence. 
According to the recommendation, the board of directors evaluates the independence of 
each director and majority shall be independent or in other words, is not in an employment 
relationship or service contract with the company.  This topic will be discussed further in 
chapter 3. Recommendation XI states that the board shall report its work in a written 
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charter including its main duties and working principles. The report enables company 
shareholders to evaluate all its operations. Adequate amount of information regarding 
company’s operations adds transparency and diminish the risk of agency costs. While 
corporate boards are responsible for reporting to shareholders, they shall be allowed to 
receive enough information from the company.  
 
Recommendation XII states that the board of directors has the right to receive information 
about business operations, operating environment and financial position. Furthermore, as 
stated in recommendation XIII, the board needs to collect an annual performance 
evaluation of its operations and working methods. This evaluation can be either internal 
reporting or conducted by an external reporter and it can include such things as the 
composition of the board of directors, efficiency of each of the directors or meeting 
preparations.  
 
 
 International legislation 
 
Besides national laws and recommendations, Finnish companies are required to take into 
consideration international legislation. Companies with subsidiaries abroad need to act 
by the national legislation of the country where they operate in. Moreover, since Finland 
joined the European Union in 1995, Finnish companies are regulated by the EU 
legislation. European Union law is divided in to primary and secondary legislation of 
which primary legislation consists of the ground rules. Secondary legislation consists of 
regulations, directives and other acts. All EU countries need to follow these primary and 
secondary legislation set by the EU parliament. The commission of the European Union 
makes proposals for new laws. (European Union 2017). 
 
Commission of the European Union published their latest action plan on company law 
and corporate governance in 2012. According to the action plan, corporate governance of 
European companies is mainly in responsibility of companies themselves. However, EU 
corporate governance framework, including both legislation and “soft law”, referring to 
national corporate governance codes, regulates corporate governance carried out by 
21 
 
European companies. In the action plan, European commission points out that 
weaknesses in corporate governance of financial institutions played a role in the past 
financial crisis. Thus, the European company law needs to be modernized. The latest 
additions to the action plan are; Enhancing transparency, engaging shareholders, and 
supporting companies’ growth and their competitiveness (European Union 2012). The 
focus of the EU commission with regards to EU company law is to increase external 
control of public companies and reduce risk of financial losses due to loose corporate 
governance policies. 
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3. BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND DIVERSITY 
 
People from diverse backgrounds often provide a more effective board in terms of 
decision making. Diversity can significantly reduce the risk of groupthink, a 
psychological behavior including conflict aversion and lack of critical evaluation. This 
can, in turn, have a negative impact on innovating. Diversity is often regarded as a value-
adding feature in any organization. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the 
concepts of diversity, board of directors, agent theory and director independence. 
Furthermore, this chapter discusses advisory and oversight functions, the two 
fundamental responsibilities of corporate boards.  
       
   
 Board of directors 
 
The board of directors is a significant component in company’s corporate governance. In 
a publicly listed company, the board is elected to represent company’s owners, the 
shareholders. Moreover, the board of directors is in charge of the company, together with 
company’s shareholders. According to the requirements, each publicly listed company 
must have a corporate board and it serves as the advisory unit for the management of the 
company. The duties of board of directors are different to those of the management as 
directors’ responsibility is to advice management on corporate strategy rather than 
develop it (Larcker & Tayan 2011: 68). Board of directors is not an extension of 
company’s management, they supervise managers’ actions and report it to the owners. 
Board members should always act in the best interest of the company and shareholders.  
 
Larcker & Tayan (2011: 67–68) point out two fundamental responsibilities of the board 
of directors: advice management and monitor its operations. Board members are usually 
selected based on their skills in pursuance of successfully advising management in 
corporate governance matters, hence the advisory function. Furthermore, the board is 
responsible for monitoring the management of the company to ensure that they are serving 
best interests of the owners. Board of directors select chief executive officer for the 
company. Moreover, the board measures and evaluates firm corporate performance. 
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Corporate board’s duties and responsibilities are presented in company’s constitution. 
Additionally, there are several legal requirements regarding corporate boards of publicly 
listed companies. National requirements regarding boards of the companies listed in the 
Nasdaq OMX Helsinki stock exchange are presented in chapter 2.2 and 2.3.  
 
Corporate boards hold general meetings, scheduled by the chairman of the board. 
Traditionally, the CEO of the company serves as the chairman, however, recent trend is 
that more and more non-executive directors are nominated as the chairmen. Behind this 
trend is a possible agency problem arising from such dual chairman/CEO of a company. 
If the company’s CEO serves as the chairman for the board of directors, true 
independence of the board is jeopardized. The control of the information and agenda of 
corporate board is a genuine challenge for the board of directors. (Larcker & Tayan 2011: 
70; Monks & Minow 2011: 261.) 
  
Corporate boards have different committees consisting of directors. Some of the board’s 
responsibilities are designated to board committees. Directors are assigned to these 
committees based on their personal skills and previous experience. In the US, according 
to the 2002 Sarbanese-Oxley Act, all publicly listed companies must have at least four 
committees: audit committee, compensation committee, governance committee and 
nominating committee. The audit committee is responsible for inspecting company’s 
external auditing process and is the link between the external auditor and the company. 
The compensation committee sets CEO compensation and advice in the compensation of 
other senior executives. The governance committee evaluates the company’s governance 
structure. The nominating committee searches for and nominates new directors for the 
corporate board when board seats become available. Corporate boards can form 
additional committees, such as financing, corporate social responsibility, science and 
technology or legal committees. All committees oversee and advice in their specific 
functions. (Larcker & Tayan 2011: 72–74.) 
 
Finnish publicly listed companies have similar committees as the US counterparties, for 
instance, audit, nomination and remuneration committees. Members of the committees 
are often appointed for the committees annually. Committees report the minutes of the 
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meetings to the board of directors who are further responsible for reporting to the 
shareholders. Again, the CEO and executive management of the company report their 
actions to the board of directors. Thus, the decision-making and reporting is divided to 
several governing bodies.  
 
Board members often come from a business background or have a good understanding of 
financial reports. According to Monks & Minow (2011: 261), it is common that directors 
are current or former executives and have held top management positions. Moreover, 
academics and government officials or military leaders are often represented in corporate 
boards. Corporate directors tend to hold several directorships at the same time, i.e. to sit 
in multiple corporate boards simultaneously. According to Fich & Shivdasani (2006), 
firms with such “busy board members” are associated with poor corporate governance. 
These firms had lower market-to-book ratios and overall weaker profitability than those 
with board members operating in just one corporate board. Furthermore, Fich & 
Shivdasani (2006) found out that boards with busy directors who are independent, or in 
other words, do not exhibit conflicts of interest with any of the stakeholders of the 
company, were associated with weaker performance and the departure of such board 
members generated positive abnormal returns. The results of this study question whether, 
in fact, director independence is important for company’s success and rather suggest that 
board members are more effective when they have more time and full focus on one 
directorship alone. 
 
 
 Director independence 
 
Board members are expected to be free from conflicts of interest i.e. exhibit 
independence. An independent or a non-executive director is a person with no 
employment or service contract with the firm. Independent director is and outsider with 
no other connection to the company. According to Monks & Minow (2011: 257), over 
the past decades, the number of independent directors has increased substantially. One of 
the objectives of the SOX amongst other regulations regarding publicly listed companies 
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has been to increase board independence. Europe and Finland follow in the footsteps of 
the US regulatory agencies by increasing requirements regarding director independence. 
 
The definition of an independent director may have different national variations however, 
most agree that an independent director shall have no connection to the company besides 
sitting in the corporate board. Finnish Securities Market Association lists key features of 
an independent director. These features include: 
 
i) the director has no employment relationship or service contract with the 
company and hasn’t had such relationship for the past three years.  
ii) the director receives, or has not received during the past year remuneration for 
services e.g. consulting assignments, from the company.  
iii) the director does not belong to the operative management of another 
corporation which has had a significant relationship with the company e.g. 
supplier over the past year. 
iv) the director is not the auditor of the company, a partner of the present auditor, 
or a partner or an employee in an audit firm that has been the company’s 
auditor in the past three years. 
v) the director does not belong to the operative management of another company 
whose director is a member of the operative management of the company 
(interlocking control relationship). 
 
According to the Finnish CG code (Securities Market Association 2016), Finnish publicly 
listed companies shall consist mainly of independent directors and at least two of them 
shall be independent of significant shareholders of the company although it is 
recommended that most directors hold company shares (Securities Market Association 
2016.)  
  
An independent director is considered to be more effective in advisory and oversight 
functions (Larcker & Tayan 2011: 69). Lack of sufficient supervision of company’s 
management can lead to reckless management and huge financial losses. In Enron’s case 
of 2001, for example, it emerged that the board of directors failed in its oversight function, 
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eventually leading to a bankruptcy of the corporation (see e.g. Erhardt et al. 2003). 
Independent boards reduce the risk of such scandals. Director independence is essential, 
if the board is supervising company’s management. However, director independence is 
rarely easily achieved and, as stated by Adams (2016), particularly challenging to 
measure.  
 
Although, it is possible to investigate professional and financial connections between 
directors, companies and management, it is somewhat impossible to define and regulate 
personal connections of these participants. Monks & Minow (2011) reminded that in 
many cases, directors and managers have outside-business connections which could alter 
the independence of judgement. People may share a hobby, for example, or have family 
ties through common friends.  
 
 
 Agent theory 
 
Most large firms have a common feature; management and ownership of the company 
are separated. Shareholders or the owners of the company have representatives, directors, 
who delegate management of the company to its officers. Such separation of management 
typically creates conflicts of interests. Shareholders interest is usually maximize their 
wealth or, in other words, increase the value of earnings per share. Company’s 
management may be more interested to increase their salaries and keep their positions 
within the company. This fundamental corporate governance issue of different interests 
of company’s stakeholders is called agency problem or agency theory. Agency problem 
occurs between the company’s shareholders and executives who might both have 
different interests. In general, shareholders interest is maximizing the share value whereas 
managers may have other interests such as expanding personal career or optimize 
bonuses.  
 
If both managers and shareholders are utility maximizers, the behavior often leads to a 
conflict of interest which, in turn, results in additive expense.  This concept is called an 
agency cost. The concept was first introduced by Jensen & Mecklin (1976) and has 
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thereafter been a fundamental matter in corporate governance. Jensen & Mecklin (1976) 
defined agency costs as the sum of monitoring and bonding expenditures plus the residual 
loss. This residual loss is defined as the reduction in welfare experienced by the 
shareholder as a result of avoidance of duties by the managers.  
 
Corporate law provides different solutions to avoid agency costs or agency problem. 
Previous findings suggest that corporate boards and their actions play vital role in the 
battle against agency problem. Boards monitor the actions of firm managers to ensure 
they act in the shareholder’s interests. Boards, for example, report shareholders about any 
possible issue within the company and advice managers (see e.g. Bainbridge 2012; 
Larcker & Tayan 2011). Bainbridge (2012) stated that board of directors’ duty is to 
monitor senior management and replace those whose performance does not meet the 
requirements. However, he pointed out that monitoring is time-consuming work and 
directors may prefer spending their time on other matters such as leisure. Moreover, board 
meetings are short and directors may not get enough vital information in order to 
effectively monitor managers.  
 
Healy & Palepu (2001) suggested that there are few solutions to the agency problem. In 
addition to having effective and reliable corporate boards, Healy & Palepu (2001) 
suggested that optimal contracts between principals and agents may, in turn, reduce the 
risk of agency costs. The suggested contracts are for example compensation agreements 
and debt contracts which require managers to disclose relevant information enabling 
investors to monitor pursuance with contractual agreements and evaluate management of 
firm’s resources in the shareholder’s interest.  
 
Compensation programs are often reported to increase firm profitability. Mehran (1995), 
for example, reported that firm performance is positively related to equity-based 
compensation of managers. Equity compensations, such as options and stocks can 
encourage managers to increase shareholder’s wealth as managers simultaneously 
increase their own wealth. In fact, Mehran (1995) found out that it is rather the form, not 
the level of compensation that seems to motivate managers to increase firm profitability.  
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 Gender diversity 
 
The term diversity describes a condition, where a variety of different elements are 
presented. Organizational diversity refers to a heterogeneous group of people, 
organizations employees, with diverse backgrounds. Previous research on diversity issues 
in corporate governance, present two distinctions of diversity, demographic and cognitive 
(see e.g. Erhardt et al. 2003). Demographic or “observable diversity” contains, among 
other things, racial, ethnical or political diversity. Furthermore, observable diversity can 
be based on age and gender. Examples of cognitive or “non-observable diversity” are 
education and personality characteristics. Studies on diversity and firm performance often 
focus on demographic diversity, perhaps due to difficulties of measuring cognitive 
diversity. This study focuses on gender diversity, since it is a current topic of interest after 
the increase of women in corporate boards and top management positions. Furthermore, 
it is of great importance to evaluate the impact of national recommendations regarding 
gender diversity on the composition of corporate boards and firm’s financial success.  
 
Minorities are often regarded as a quality resource for organizations. Differences in 
personal characteristics result in broad spectrum of opinions. Gender diversity in the 
boardroom is continuously discussed in the media due to latest regulations and 
recommendations concerning gender equality. Organizational diversity and diversity 
management are trendy topics in financial research and studies on human resources 
management. Finnish newspaper Kauppalehti (27.6.2014), reported about the latest 
financial research on companies that are run by female CEOs and board members in an 
article “Tutkimus: Naisjohtoiset yritykset muita vakaampia”. According to the article, 
female representation in the boardroom may have a positive impact on firm performance 
perhaps due to the fact that women are generally more responsible than men and ore more 
often present when in the meetings of corporate boards.   
 
Women are often regarded more conservative and risk averse than men in personal 
financial decisions (See e.g. Croson & Gneezy 2009; Watson & Mcnaughton 2007). Risk 
aversion and careful thinking within the boardroom could, in turn, lead to a  more stable 
financial performance, especially during periods of financial crisis. Palvia, Vähämaa & 
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Vähämaa (2015), for example, found out that banks with female CEOs were less likely 
to fail during the latest financial crisis than banks that were run by their male counterparts. 
Palvia et al. (2015) argued that banks with female CEOs and chairmen held more equity 
capital and had lower default risk, making these banks safer and less risky than those with 
lower equity capital and greater risk of lenders unable to pay for their financial 
obligations. Overall, the study results of Palvia et al. (2015) indicate that female 
representation in management and in the boardroom increase financial stability within 
financial institutions. 
 
Studies have shown that diversity has a positive impact on company’s success. Carter et 
al. (2003) claimed that diversity has a positive impact on firm value for the following 
reasons: Firstly, as markets are becoming more diverse, corporate diversity must be in 
line with this recent trend. Secondly, creativity and innovation increase together with 
diversity. Thirdly, diverse corporations have wider perspectives which can be effective in 
problem-solving. Fourthly, diversity in corporate management enhances the 
effectiveness. Finally, diversity is beneficial in global relationship, when operating for 
example in a different culture.  
 
Finland is one of the leading European countries in nominating women to top 
management positions. As reported in the Chamber of Commerce survey (2014), Finland 
held the European Union record for women represented in the board of directors of listed 
companies. According to the European Institute of Gender Equality survey on largest 
European listed companies of 2016, Finland held the 6th position in nomination of women 
as presidents, board members and employee representatives. In 2016, 30,1 per cent of 
these seats belonged to women in largest, publicly listed companies. According to the 
survey, the greatest number of women represented in top management positions with 44,6 
per cent belonged to Island. Overall, all five Nordic countries were ranked amongst 7 
countries with the highest percentage of women in top positions within largest publicly 
listed companies. On the contrary, in Malta, only 4,6 per cent of the senior executive 
positions and board seats belonged to women. (European Institute of Gender Equality). 
Figure 1 illustrates the composition of board of directors within the largest publicly listed 
companies of the EU_2015 countries for years 2003 and 2016, respectively.  
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Figure 1. Women in the boardroom of the largest publicly listed companies of the EU_15 
countries. Years 2003 and 2016. Source: European Institute of Gender Equality (2017). 
 
The number of women in the boardrooms of European companies has increased 
drastically between years 2003–2016, illustrated in Figure 1. EU average of women in 
the board of directors for the largest, publicly listed companies of 2016 is 23,9 per cent 
whereas in 2003, only 8,5 per cent of the board seats belong to women. Companies’ board 
of directors in France and Italy have experimented the greatest transformation during the 
past decades. Previously, more than 95 per cent of the board seats in French and Italian 
companies belonged to men. However, in 2016, over 40 per cent of the board seats in 
French companies and a little less than 35 per cent of the seats in Italian companies 
belonged to women.  Again, all Nordic countries belong to top half of the EU_15 
countries in terms of gender diversity during the period of 2003–2016. Sweden has been 
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the leading Nordic country in the nomination of female directors for the period of 
examination.  
 
After the latest financial crisis and previous corporate governance scandals, such as Enron 
and WorldCom, many countries have paid increasing amount of attention to composition 
of corporate boards. In many previous corporate governance incidents, board of directors 
played a significant role. In the case of WorldCom, directors had social connections to 
executive officers and fellow directors, making their ability to represent board 
independence unachievable and undermined their competence to supervise company’s 
operations. The underlying reason for the WorldCom to collapse was the lack of internal 
control. (Bainbridge 2012: 59, 141).  
 
Internal control can be improved by increasing board diversity since it is believed that 
diverse board is more independent and less beholden to management (see e.g. Carter et 
al. 2003; Kang, Cheng, Gray 2007). Today, an increasing number of policymakers deem 
that gender diversity in corporate boards is associated with success and better supervision 
of corporations. Hence, board diversity recommendations are regularly included in 
national corporate governance policies.  
 
Finnish Chamber of Commerce has published a report regarding women in the 
boardrooms of Finnish listed companies (Chamber of Commerce 2016). According to the 
survey, the number of women in corporate boards has increased substantially since 2003, 
when the first recommendation regarding women as board members was first introduced. 
In 2003, only 7 per cent of directors in listed companies were women, whereas in 2016, 
the representation of women in the boardroom was already 25 per cent. Moreover, in 
2016, 90 per cent of companies had at least one woman as a member of the board of 
directors. This is a remarkable increase as in 2008, when an exact recommendation of the 
representation of both genders was added to the Corporate Governance Code, only 50 per 
cent of the companies had both genders in the boardrooms. The trend has been consistent 
as, each year, the representation of women in corporate boards increase. Between 2011 
and 2016, the number of women directors has increased nearly a quarter. In 2011, 18 per 
cent of all directors were women, when in 2016 the representation was already 25 per 
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cent. According to the Corporate Governance Code of 2016, all publicly listed companies 
are required to report their principles regarding diversity from the beginning of 2017. 
Moreover, in Finland, at least 40 per cent of state-owned enterprises must have such 
composition of the board of directors where at least 40 per cent of board seats belong to 
women.  
 
According to the latest national program on gender equality, the representation of women 
in the boardrooms of state-owned enterprises should be around 40–60 per cent by the year 
2020 (See e.g. Institutional Repository for the Government 2016). Due to these national 
recommendations and recent trend in corporate governance, it is assumable that there will 
be a slight increase in the number of women in corporate boards in 2017. Figure 2 
illustrates the composition of corporate boards in Finnish publicly listed companies 
between years 2011 and 2016.   
 
 
The recent trend in the nomination of women as new board members is positive, however, 
the number of women in top management positions is still relatively low.  The chamber 
of Commerce report that, in 2017, six publicly listed companies had a woman as chief 
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Figure 2. Composition of boards in Finnish publicly listed companies. Source: 
Chamber of Commerce (2016). 
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executive officer. As a comparison, in 2011 none of the publicly listed companies had a 
woman as their CEO so there has been a slight increase during the past six years.  To date, 
vast majority of Finnish publicly listed companies still choose men in top management 
positions.  
 
Evidence from Nasdaq OMX Helsinki stock exchange shows another characteristic of 
corporate boards; the mean of director age is relatively high, around 55 years. Diversity 
based on age does not seem to fluctuate over the years. In fact, Helsingin Sanomat 
(5.8.2016) reported that the average age of a corporate director has increased from 55 to 
56 during the past 5 years. Half of the board seats belongs to 50–60 years old directors 
and over 30 per cent of directors are 60–70 years old. Thus, although many studies have 
shown that board diversity increases firm profitability, directors still present a 
homogeneous group of people with similar characteristics. Typical director of a Finnish, 
publicly listed company is a white, middle-aged man with previous experience in top 
management positions. (Nasdaq OMX Helsinki 2017; Asiakastieto 2016; Helsingin 
Sanomat 2016.) 
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4. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
 
This chapter introduces previous research on diversity issues. The purpose of this chapter 
is to provide reader an overview of the fundamental studies on gender diversity and firm 
performance. Furthermore, this chapter introduces both the earliest and the latest findings 
of studies regarding the representation of women in top management positions and the 
impact of board diversity on firm performance. The focus is on the different research 
methods of the previous studies. Chapter 4.1. introduces studies concerning women in 
senior executive positions and the link between financial performance and  diverse 
management. Chapter 4.2. discusses previous papers on board of director diversity and 
firm performance.  
  
 
 Women in top management positions and firm performance 
 
One of the earliest researches on heterogeneity and firm performance is the paper by 
Murray (1989) which studies the impact of top management group heterogeneity on firm 
performance. Murray assumed that heterogenic management group increase firm’s ability 
to adapt although he makes an assumption that heterogeneity is negatively related to 
firm’s efficiency. Murray tested these hypothesis on Fortune 500 firms and found 
significant correlation between short-term performance and management heterogeneity. 
However, his findings were not overall consistent. The results of the study were altered 
by the industry, assumed time lag between cause and effect and the measure of 
performance chosen.  
 
The paper by Shrader et al. (1997) studies the firm-level relationship between women in 
management and financial performance in the 200 largest US firms in terms of market 
value. They made an assumption that firms who recruit more women perform better due 
to being more competitive and more progressive. Thus, they tested for three hypothesis; 
the percentages of women in management, in top management positions and in the 
boardroom are positively related to financial performance. They calculated diversity 
ratios for women in management, women in top management and women in the board of 
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directors in order to investigate the link between these ratios and financial performance 
of each of the sample firms.  
 
The performance measures used in the paper by Shrader et al. (1997) are return on sales, 
return on asset, return on investment and return on equity for the years 1992 and 1993. 
Control variables in the study are total number of managers, total number of top managers 
and total number of board members. The results of the hierarchical regression model 
indicated that women managers of large firms are linked to higher ROS, ROA, ROI and 
ROE. However, Shrader et al. (1997) did not find positive relationship between financial 
performance and higher percentages of women in top management or in the board of 
directors. Their explanation for these results was that there were very few women in top 
management positions or in the boardroom and such small representation had very small 
impact in general. Again, they reminded that the sample was extremely homogeneous as 
it only contained 200 of the largest US firms and their further suggestion was to replicate 
the study on small and mid-cap firms.  
 
Smith, Smith & Verner (2006) examined the relationship between management diversity 
and firm performance by conducting a panel study on 2 500 Danish firms. They 
investigated the impact of women in top executive positions and board of directors on 
firm financial performance. They used four variables to measure performance; gross 
profit/net sales, contribution margin/net sales, operating income/net assets and net income 
after tax/net assets. The sample period was 1993–2001 and it included both public and 
private Danish companies, the average firm size being 219 employees.  
 
Such large sample and the data set made it possible to control for direction of causality. 
Smith et al. (2006) defined board diversity in two ways. First measure for board diversity 
is simply the proportion of women in the board of directors. Second measure for board 
diversity consists of executive directors and a special group of directors elected by staff 
members. Smith et al. (2006) measured gender diversity in management by the top CEOs 
of the company as well as top CEOs and vice-directors of the firm. Control variables in 
the analysis were industry sector, firm size (number of employees), firm age, and export 
orientation of a firm.  
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In the study by Smith et al. (2006), the relationship between performance and number of 
women in top management was studied by conducting a panel data regression. The results 
showed a positive and statistically significant correlation between the number of female 
CEOs and three of the four performance measures. However, the relationship between 
firm performance and number of women in the board of directors is not obvious as, when 
the board diversity measure is added to the regression model, only one performance 
measure coefficient turns out to be positive and statistically significant. Furthermore, an 
interesting observation of the study was that positive effects of female CEOs on firm 
performance are related mainly to women with a university degree. Again, female board 
members, who are elected by the staff, are more prone to have a positive impact on firm 
performance than other female directors.  
 
Christiansen, Lin, Pereira, Topalova & Turk (2016) investigated the correlation between 
gender diversity in senior executive positions and firm performance. The study involved 
two million European companies, both public and private, over the study period. As an 
interesting notion, Christiansen et al. (2016) reported that, on average, women covered 
19 per cent of corporate board seats and 14 per cent of senior executive positions in the 
top 600 publicly listed firms in Europe. 
 
In the empirical analysis, Christiansen et al. (2016) found a positive relationship between 
firm performance and number of women in top management positions. After controlling 
for corporate governance factors, the study results indicated that higher share of female 
representation in the decision-making team is associated with higher net income, higher 
profit before taxes and higher EBIT rates. Christiansen et al. (2016) also tested their 
research hypothesis that gender diversity would increase financial performance in 
industrial sectors that are predominantly female. According to the findings, the 
relationship between number of women in top managerial positions and firm performance 
vary across different industrial sectors. The correlation between positive financial 
performance and the number of women in senior positions is more pronounced in service, 
high-tech and knowledge-intensive sectors.  
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 Board diversity and firm performance 
 
The paper “Corporate governance, board diversity, and firm value” by Carter et al. 
(2003) investigates the link between board diversity and Tobin’s Q for Fortune 1000 
firms. Descriptive statistics of the final sample of 638 firms in 1997 shows that around 
half of the corporate boards had just one female board member and one fourth of the 
boards had no women in the board of directors. When compared to latest findings on both 
US and European corporations, there has been a substantial increase in the number of 
women on corporate boards since the late 1990’s. For example, the S&P500 firms 
reported that only around three per cent of the companies had no women in the boardroom 
and little less than 25 per cent of these companies had just one female director (Catalyst 
2017).  
 
Furthermore, Carter et al. reported a certain pattern in the existence of women and 
minorities in the board of directors in different industrial sectors. According to the study, 
financial services firms had the highest number of women and minorities in the 
boardroom whereas mining and construction, as well as travel, entertainment and “other 
services” had the lowest percentage of women and minorities in corporate boards. Thus, 
it is reasonable to assume that the number of women varies between different industrial 
sectors.  
 
In the empirical analysis, Carter et al (2003) estimated the relationship between firm value 
in terms of Tobin’s Q and board diversity. They control for board size, number of annual 
meetings, CEO/chair duality, director compensation, insider ownership and insiders on 
board. Furthermore, firm size, ROA and industry dummy are added to the model. The 
study results show a strong link between firm value and female directors, more precisely, 
a positive relationship between female director on board and firm size, board size and 
Tobin’s Q. They reported similar results for minority directors and firm value. Moreover, 
they conclude that the increase of female directors on board is positively correlated with 
the number of minorities in the board of directors. All in all, these results strongly support 
the assumption that diverse board of directors is positively related to firm value. Similar 
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results are provided in the study by Erhardt et al. (2003), who also reported positive 
association between performance indicators and board diversity.  
 
Campbell & Minguez-vera (2008) investigated the impact of women representation in the 
board of directors on firm performance of Spanish firms. The study is interesting due to 
the fact that, in Spain, gender diversity within the board of directors has been amongst 
the lowest in Europe. In 2015, the average number of women in the boardroom of the 
largest firms of EU28 was 21,2 per cent when in Spain the number was only 16,8 per cent 
(European commission 2015). Although there has been an improvement since the 
publication of the paper by Campbell & Minguez-Vera (2008), where the reported 
number of women in the boardroom of Spanish firms was as low as 3,1 per cent, the 
number of female directors is still below EU28 average.  
 
The recent increase of female directors in the boardrooms of Spanish firms is presumably 
a result from the Spanish legislation of 2000’s to improve gender equality. Campbell & 
Minguez-Vera (2008) tested their hypothesis by conducting a panel data analysis, where 
the measures of gender diversity were calculated as a dummy variable to represent the 
existence of at least one female director, the percentage of women in the board of directors 
and by Blau and Shannon indices. Firm value is measured by Tobin’s Q. As a contribution 
to previous literature, Campbell & Minguez-Vera (2008) studied the causality of the 
variables involved. In other words, they investigated what is the direction of causality 
between firm performance and the number of directors. The results show that the impact 
of the existence of one or more women in the boardroom on firm performance is not 
statistically significant. However, the findings show a positive relationship between the 
gender diversity ratio and Tobin’s Q as well as between both diversity indices and Tobin’s 
Q. Moreover, the findings suggested that gender diversity ratio has an impact on firm 
performance and not vice versa.  
 
Rose (2007) investigated the link between performance as measured by Tobin’s Q and 
female representation in the board of directors. In the paper, Rose discusses the 
advantages of diverse boards on companies. Diversity within a company is generally 
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linked to good social reputation, heterogeneous group of job applicants and directors as 
well as better decision-making within the board of directors.  
 
Rose (2007) pointed out that in Denmark, it is especially common that new board 
members are recruited within a small business circle, closely connected to each other. 
Such recruitment mechanism is an impediment to improve board diversity as director 
candidates with better expertise could be eliminated.  In addition to the number of female 
directors, Rose (2007) included variables considering educational background, payment 
information and ownership for each board member in the empirical analysis.  Several 
other corporate governance control variables are included in the study. The study 
consisted of a panel data set of Danish publicly listed companies between years 1998–
2001. The results of the regression analysis show that the coefficients between the number 
of women and Tobin’s Q as well as the dummy variable for the representation of women 
in the boardroom and Tobin’s Q are both close to or equal to zero. Thus, according to the 
findings of Rose (2007) gender has no impact on performance. In addition, educational 
background of the board members has no statistically significant impact on firm 
performance.  
 
The findings of Adams & Ferreira (2009) are also in contradiction to most other studies 
investigating the relationship between gender diversity and firm performance. Adams & 
Ferreira (2009) found a negative relationship between diverse board of directors and firm 
performance. Adams et al. used a proxy for Tobin’s Q and ROA as performance 
measures. The sample consisted of an unbalanced panel data from 1 939 companies 
between years 1993–2003. The performance model includes the fraction of women 
directors, board size and director independence, logarithm of sales, number of business 
segments, dummy variables for different years and SIC industry code for industry 
classification.  
 
Adams & Ferreira (2009) found a positive and significant relation between gender 
diversity and Tobin’s Q. However, after adding firm fixed effects to the model, the 
relationship turned negative but remained statistically significant. They replicated the 
model for ROA and ended up with similar results. Thus, they suggested that previous 
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findings on positive correlation between diversity and firm performance are a result of 
omitted firm-specific factors. Overall, Adams & Ferreira (2009) found that diversity has 
a positive impact on performance in firms with weak governance but suggested that firms 
with strong governance policies should not imply gender quotas in the boardroom as it 
could lead to poorer financial performance.  
 
All in all, many previous papers suggest that there is a link between board diversity and 
firm performance. Earlier studies examining this relationship are conducted mainly with 
US data. However, an increasing number of studies on board diversity in European 
markets are being published. According to the results, there is no significant difference in 
the findings between the Anglo-Saxon countries where, according to Campbell & 
Minguez-Vera (2008), investors are more protected, and most European counties where 
legal system is based on the civil law. However, few studies do not support the belief that 
increase in diversity leads to improved financial performance. This may be because of 
differences in empirical models, performance measures or control variables as well as 
differences in data set.  
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5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter introduces data and methodology used in this study. First sub-chapter 
describes the data used to conduct the study. Second sub-chapter defines the research 
method of the analysis.  
 
 
 Data description 
 
Financial data for this study is collected from Orbis database and it includes public 
companies, listed in NASDAQ OMX Helsinki stock exchange. Furthermore, national 
newspaper Helsingin Sanomat was contacted in order to get access to data regarding 
composition of the board of directors for each of the publicly listed firms. Helsingin 
Sanomat has previously gathered data regarding gender diversity of Finnish publicly 
listed firms. The original source of data regarding composition of the board of directors 
is from the Trade Register collected by the Finnish Patent and Registration Office. The 
data was obtained from Suomen Asiakastieto Oy by Helsingin Sanomat (Sanoma Media 
Finland Oy) and gathered for further usage. Access to this data was granted by Helsingin 
Sanomat to conduct this study. This data involves the number of directors and the 
representation of women in the boardroom as well as nationality of each director for the 
Nasdaq OMX Helsinki firms. 
 
The sample includes companies from all industrial sectors represented in the Helsinki 
stock exchange. During this study, the total of 138 companies are listed in the NASDAQ 
OMX Helsinki stock exchange of which 25 companies are dropped out due to missing 
information regarding the sex of each of the directors. Hence, the total number of 
companies with reported data on gender of the board of directors is 113. Furthermore, as 
the study involves financial data for each of the companies for years 2011 and 2016, 
respectively, some companies had to be eliminated from the final sample due to missing 
financial information. These companies did not report sufficient financial data for the 
fiscal years of 2011 or 2016. Some companies went public and few of the listed 
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companies merged together during the period of 2011-2016 thus being eliminated from 
the sample.  
 
Five of the 87 companies that reported sufficient information, are excluded from the 
analysis as extreme outliers (ROA and ROE measures >100) as these observations could 
seriously distort test results. The final sample consists of 82 companies. The final sample 
of this study holds around 60 per cent of all the publicly listed companies traded in the 
Finnsih stock exchange during the research period. All companies and the descriptive 
statistics included in the empirical analysis are listed in Appendix 1.  
 
5.1.1. Performance measures 
 
An effective and simple way to evaluate the success of the board of directors and 
corporate governance is to measure and compare firm financial performance in terms of 
rates of return. This study evaluates financial performance by comparing two measures, 
return on asset and return on equity (hereafter ROA and ROE) calculated for each of the 
sample firms. Multiple previous studies regarding board diversity use ROA and ROE as 
the performance measure (See e.g. Carter et al. 2003; Smith et al. 2006; Shrader et al. 
1997).  These two ratios give an understanding of the return that each company obtains 
versus the amount of (invested) capital at risk (Asquith & Weiss 2016: 31).   
 
In general, higher ROA and ROE indicate better returns on the firm’s investments thus 
making the firm more fascinating for investors. There are no universal values for these 
two ratios that would indicate good or bad performance. However, ROE values above 
15–20 per cent are often regarded as “good” and for ROA, values above 10 per cent often 
indicate that the company is performing well (See e.g. Balance consulting / Kauppalehti 
tietopalvelut). As seen later in Figure 3, there are differences in average ratios between 
different industries thus indicating that the two ratios are not directly proportional in 
different industrial sectors. These rates of return are often compared to industry or stock 
exchange averages in order to get a better understanding of the financial performance of 
a particular company.  
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Return on Asset 
 
ROA examines firm profitability as earnings per dollar employed. There are several ways 
to calculate ROA and no universal definition of ROA exists. The denominator of this ratio 
is often either company’s earnings before income and taxes (hereafter EBIT) or Profit 
Before Taxes (hereafter P/L before tax). The difference between these two digits is that 
company’s EBIT consists of company’s profit before paying taxes and interest on debt 
whereas P/L before tax or EBT is the difference between EBIT and interest income and 
expense. (Bodie, Kane & Marcus 2014: 641). Bodie et al. (2014) define ROA as follows: 
 
(1)    ROA = P/L before tax / Total assets, 
 
where: 
P/L before tax is EBIT minus interest expense plus interest income from the 
income statement 
 Total assets are company’s total assets from the balance sheet. 
 
EBIT sums up total earnings of a company but ignores liabilities to tax authorities. EBIT 
takes into consideration all interest expenses coming from debt financing and ignores 
taxation expenses.  (Bodie et al. 2014: 636). P/L before tax is often replaced by net income 
as is done in this study for simplicity’s sake. Orbis database defines ROA in a simplified 
way (Orbis 2017): 
 
(2)  ROAt = (net income / total assets) x 100 
 
Where:  
Net income is company’s net income from the income statement; 
Total assets are company’s total assets from the balance sheet 
 
First definition (1) of ROA is often presented in finance textbooks (See e.g. Bodie et al. 
2014). Moreover, some textbooks present ROA as the quotient of after-tax interest and 
net income divided by total assets (See e.g. Brealey, Myers, Allen 2011). This paper use 
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a straightforward definition of ROA in the empirical analysis, where the numerator is 
simply net income.  
 
Return on equity 
 
Whereas ROA measures company’s profitability with respect to total assets, ROE focuses 
exclusively on equity. In other words, ROE leaves out any debt-financed assets that the 
company holds. This ratio is often favored by shareholders as it presents company’s return 
on net income per dollar that shareholders have invested in the firm. ROE is a good 
indicator for efficiency with which companies utilize shareholders’ capital (Jacque 2014: 
668) and as such, is an important assessment tool in firm valuation. The definition of ROE 
is more unambiguous than ROA. In this paper, ROE is defined as (See e.g. Bodie et al. 
2014: 642): 
 
(3)    ROE = (Net income / Shareholder’s equity) x 100  
 
where: 
 Net income is company’s net income from the income statement; 
Shareholder’s equity is the difference between total assets and total liabilities.  
 
In the income statement, company’s net income is calculated as company’s earnings 
before income and taxes or EBIT minus all interest and tax expenses (Bodie et al. 2014: 
643). Net income is often the bottom line in the income statement. Shareholder’s equity 
is calculated from the balance sheet and it includes typically all common stocks, preferred 
stocks, retained earnings and treasury stocks. In other words, shareholder’s equity is the 
amount of equity within a company that belong to shareholders. In Orbis database, ROE 
is similarly defined as the ratio between net income / shareholder’s funds.  
 
The chosen performance indicators, ROA and ROE for the sample firms are reported in 
Table 1. These two financial ratios are given in the Orbis database and are calculated 
using financial statements of the sample firms for two years 2011 and 2016.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for sample firms. Performance measures, ROA and ROE 
and total assets drawn from the Nasdaq OMX Helsinki firms.  
Variable Mean Median  Std 
ROA2011 5,62 4,56 8,95 
ROA2016 4,40 4,03 6,64 
ROE2011 11,25 10,77 15,94 
ROE2016 8,80 9,78 13,50 
Assets2016 2 596 957 327 753 7 000 392 
Note: Firm performance of the Nasdaq OMX Helsinki firms is presented for fiscal years 
2011 and 2016 including all the companies with sufficient financial data. Assets in t€. 
Number of observations (N=82). 
 
As Reported in Table 1, the average ROA of the sample firms in 2016 is around 4,40 (per 
cent). The average ROE of the sample firms is around 8,80. These values were below the 
2011 level, when the reported average ROA for the sample firms was 5,62 and ROE 
11,25. Moreover, in 2016, the median for ROE is 9,82 as in 2011 it was 10,77 and for 
ROA, 2016 median is 4,03 as in 2011 the reported median was 4,56. According to these 
statistics and performance measures, the average profitability of the Finnish publicly 
listed companies has somewhat decreased during the period.   
 
The comparison of financial performance between companies is often conducted for 
different industrial sectors due to differences in financial ratio averages between 
industrial sectors. As was assumed, within the final sample of 82 firms, there are 
differences in ROA and ROE measures between different industrial sectors. Hence, firms 
in the final sample are classified in to three sub-categories according to their ICB code, 
defined more precisely in chapter 5.2. The sub-categories are as follows; industrials, 
goods & services and information technology. Around 44 per cent of the firms belong to 
a sub-category of industrial companies. Approximately 32 per cent of the firms are 
consumer goods & services or healthcare providers. 24 per cent of the firms within the 
final sample belong to third sub-category of information technology.  
 
Figure 3. illustrates the average ROA and ROE of 2016 between different industrial 
sectors.   
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Figure 3. Average ROA and ROE (2016) of the companies in industrials, goods & 
services and information technology sectors.  
 
The average ROA and ROE of the industrial companies are 3,91 and 7,27, respectively. 
In comparison, goods and services sector has an average ROA and ROE of 4,92 and 
12,23. Furthermore, industrials has the highest standard deviation of ROE, 15,26, whereas 
the standard deviation of ROE for goods & services sector is 7,89. The standard 
deviations of ROA for industrials, goods & services and information technology are 5,20, 
3,54 and 9,74, respectively. These statistics indicate differences in performance measures 
within industrial sectors. Hence, it is reasonable to take this into consideration in the 
empirical analysis as this difference between ROA and ROE measures over different 
industries could affect the results.  
 
5.1.2. Board composition 
 
Some companies have foreign directors in the boardroom. The gender of these foreign 
directors is not registered in the financial database of Suomen Asiakastieto Oyj. Hence, 
an extra search is conducted in order to investigate the gender of foreign directors. Most 
directors could be found from Bloomberg database which also reports gender of these 
directors. Despite the massive effort to investigate gender of foreign directors, few 
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remained unclear. All in all, 14 companies had to be eliminated from this study because 
the sex of one or more board members remained questionable. The board of directors 
consists of current members of the board of directors and the chairman of the board. All 
deputy members are left out from the calculations. Furthermore, company CEOs are not 
regarded as board members although some of the companies reported CEO duality, that 
is, the CEO of the company also served as the chairman of the company. In such cases, 
the CEO (chairman) is regarded as a board member of the company.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for sample firms. Total number of directors, number of 
men and women in the boardroom and female directors in percentages (2016).  
Variable Total Mean Median Std Min Max 
Number of directors  529 6,45 6 1,48 3 10 
Men  391 4,77 5 1,14 2 7 
Women  138 1,68 2 0,98 0 4 
Women (%) - 25,0  25 12,6 0 50 
Note: Number of observations (N=82)  
 
As reported in Table 2, according to the 2016 data, the average number of directors in 
executive boards is 6,45. The number of the directors varies from 3 to 10. All corporate 
boards had at least two male directors. On average, a corporate board of Finnish publicly 
listed companies have around 5 men in the boardroom. However, 14 companies had no 
women in the boardroom of the company. Moreover, the total number of directors of the 
82 firms included in the final sample is 529 of which 25 per cent are women. This finding 
is constant with the findings of Chamber of Commerce, who also report that 25 per cent 
of the directors of publicly listed companies are women. As reported in Table 2, the 
average number of women directors in a corporate board is 1,52.  
 
Figure 4 illustrates board characteristics within different industrial sectors. Board of 
director statistics for different industrial sectors show minor differences in board 
composition. In the industrial sector, the average board has 6,33 board members of which 
1,67 are women. Gender diversity ratio of these boards is 26 per cent. In goods & services 
sector, the average board size is 6,25 and women hold 24 per cent of the board seats with 
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around 1,6 women in each board. Moreover, companies that operate in information 
technology sector, have, on average, 6,77 directors in the boardroom and 1,77 of the 
directors are women. The diversity ratio of is 26 per cent. These statistics show very 
similar compositions of the board of directors over different industrial sectors.  
 
 
Figure 4. Board composition of the sample firms in industrials, goods & services and 
information technology sectors.  
 
 
 Methodology 
 
The empirical analysis in this paper is studied through a panel data analysis. The 
methodology of this paper follows the previous study of Erhardt et al. (2003) with few 
changes. Firstly, instead of using US data, this paper investigates the effect of gender in 
the boardroom on firm performance using evidence from the Finnish stock market. Most 
previous studies are conducted using data from the US stock market. Secondly, instead 
of including all minorities in the diversity ratio, this paper focuses on gender diversity. 
Moreover, some of the control variables are measured slightly differently than those in 
the paper by Erhardt et al. (2003).  
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The empirical study is conducted as follows. First part of the empirical analysis examines 
correlation between independent, dependent and control variables in order to examine the 
relationships among variables. Thereafter, a hierarchical regression analysis is conducted 
in order to test for the general hypothesis. The regression analysis demonstrates the effects 
of the independent variable (board diversity ratio) on the dependent variable (ROA2016; 
ROE2016) while controlling for ROA2011, ROE2011 and industry, board size and total assets. 
Thus, the empirical analysis consists of altogether one correlation analysis and two 
regression models for both ROA and ROE as the dependent variable. Furthermore, the 
regression models include a control variable ROA and ROE at time t-5 to control for 
market fluctuations. In order to control for market fluctuations, performance indicators, 
ROA and ROE are chosen at two time points. Moreover, changes in market may have an 
impact on levels of gender diversity within an organization (See e.g. Richard 2000). This 
is in line with previous study by Erhardt et al. (2003) where performance is measured at 
two points in for two reasons; to control for changes in the market and to observe the 
impact of strategic decision-making on performance. All statistical tests and analysis are 
performed in Eviews.  
 
5.2.1. Correlation analysis 
 
Correlation analysis examines the relationships between the following variables: 
Performance measures ROA and ROE (ROAj,t; ROEj,t), total assets (ASSETSj,t), board 
size (BSIZEj,t) and board diversity (BDIVj,t) (Descriptions for these variables, see Table 
3). The correlation analysis examines whether there is significant, pairwise correlation 
between the variables used in the empirical analysis. Correlation matrix follows the 
method suggested by Cohen & Cohen (1983) and later used in the paper by Erhardt et al. 
(2003). First, correlation coefficients are calculated for each relationship between two of 
the variables involved. Correlation coefficient describes the linear correlation of the two 
variables. The correlation matrix, presented in the following chapter, shows if the 
examined variables exhibit statistical dependence in relation to each other. The 
convenient method to search for pairwise correlation is to determine Pearson’s product-
moment correlation coefficient for each two variables. Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
is the covariance of the two variables divided by the product of the standard deviations of 
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the two variables. Furthermore, covariance of two variables is the average of the products 
of the deviation score (see e.g. Cohen & Cohen 1983: 30–40). Thus, the correlation 
coefficient is calculated as follows (Cohen & Cohen 1983: 37):  
 
(4)  𝜌
𝑋,𝑌 = 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋,𝑌)
𝜎𝑋𝜎𝑌
 ,  
 
where: 
 𝐶𝑜𝑣 is the covariance; 
 𝜎𝑋 is the standard deviation of 𝑋; 
 𝜎𝑌 is the standard deviation of 𝑌. 
 
 
After calculating the correlation coefficients, the significance levels are calculated as 
suggested by Cohen & Cohen (1983: 479–480). The level of significance is determined 
by the change in the explained variance. The significance level is described by the p-value 
in the correlation matrix.  
 
5.2.2. Regression analysis 
 
H1 is examined by conducting a (linear) regression analysis for the cross-sectional data 
set. Each cross-section unit (company) has one explained or response variable (firm 
performance) and a corresponding explanatory variable (diversity ratio). The regression 
model studies the relationship between the explained and explanatory variables for each 
cross-section unit after controlling for board size, total assets and performance measures, 
ROA and ROE at time t-5.  
 
The dependent (explained) variables (Yi) in the regression model are performance 
measures ROA and ROE at time t (ROAj,t; ROEj,t). Independent variable (Xi) is the gender 
diversity ratio (BDIVt,j). This ratio is calculated by dividing the number of women in the 
boardroom by the total number of the executive directors in the company at time t. As 
previously mentioned, companies with foreign directors are eliminated from the final 
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sample, as the nationality of these directors is ambiguous. Thus, the gender diversity ratio, 
presented later in this chapter, is the number of Finnish female directors or female 
directors living permanently in Finland in relation to the total number of Finnish directors.  
 
Control variables in the regression model are natural logarithm of total assets (ASSETSj,t), 
board size (BSIZEj,t) and a dummy variable  representing the industry (INDj,t). Firm size 
is an important control variable and it has been recognized to affect the correlation 
between diversity and firm performance (See e.g. Miller 1991).  The study by Erhardt et 
al. (2003) controls for firm size by using total assets for each sample firm. Adams & 
Ferreira (2009), use logarithm of total sales as the measure of firm size. As a contribution 
to the paper by Erhardt et al. (2003), this paper use natural logarithm of total assets as a 
control variable in order to exclude extreme values from the distribution. Similar 
technique to control for the size factor is used in other studies on corporate governance 
(See e.g. Vähämaa & Vähämaa 2012; Carter et al. 2003). Shrader et al. (1997) and Erhardt 
et al. (2003) control for board size and the same technique is replicated in this paper.  
 
Previous studies have shown that the number of women in corporate boards varies 
between different industrial sectors (see e.g. Carter et al. 2003) so the possible impact of 
industry where the company operates in needs to be eliminated. Companies are divided 
in three sub-categories according to the ICB-code (Industry Classification Benchmark) 
used in the industry classification by Nasdaq OMX Helsinki stock exchange. The first 
sub-category includes 36 companies of ICB code 2700 and below, second sub-category 
consists of 20 companies with ICB-code between 3300–5700 and third sub-category 
consists of 26 companies with ICB-code 6500 and above.  
 
i) Industrials: oil & gas, industrials and basic materials. ICB ≤ 2700. 
(Industrials). 
ii) Consumer goods, consumer services and health care. 3300 ≤ ICB ≥ 5700. 
(Goods and services). 
iii) Information technology: telecom, technology, utilities and financials. ICB ≥ 
6500. (Information technology). 
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The dummy variable takes the number of 1 when the industry sector is the same as where 
the company operates in, 0 otherwise. For example, if the company is a health care 
provider, it is operating in the goods and services sector (ICB code between 3300 and 
5700). Thus, the dummy variable takes the number of one for this company within goods 
and services sector.   
 
Performance measures ROA and ROE at time t-5 (ROAj,t-5; ROEj,t-5) are used to control 
for changes in the market. The regression analysis involves two following regression 
models for both performance measures:  
 
(5)  ROA2016 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑗,𝑡 𝛽3𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗,𝑡 
+ 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴2011 +  𝜀𝑗,𝑡 
 
(6)  ROE2016 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑆𝑗,𝑡 𝛽3𝐵𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑗,𝑡 
+ 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐸2011 +  𝜀𝑗,𝑡 
 
where: 
 i is the firm and t is time; 
 ROA is the return on asset; 
ROE is the return on equity; 
 BDIVt,j is the board diversity ratio; 
 ASSETSj,t is the natural logarithm of total assets; 
 BSIZEj,t is the total number of executive directors; 
 INDj,t is the industry dummy (0 or 1).  
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
Variable Description Composition 
Independent variable 
 
BDIVj,t  Board diversity ratio No. of female directors / the total no. of directors 
Dependent  variables 
 
ROAj,t Return on asset at time t=1 (2016) net income / total assets 
ROEj,t Return on equity at time t=1 (2016) net income / shareholder’s funds  
Control Variables   
ROAj,t-5  Return on asset at time t-5 (2011) net income / total assets 
ROEj,t-5  Return on equity at time t-5 (2011) net income / shareholder’s funds  
ASSETSj,t Total assets  Natural logarithm (ln) of total assets 
BSIZEj,t Board size Total no. of executive directors 
INDj,t 
Industrial sector (Industrials; goods & 
services; information technology) 
Dummy variable:  1 when the 
industry sector is the same as where the company operates in, 
0 otherwise 
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The results of the empirical analysis are presented in this chapter for correlation and 
regression analysis. Both correlation matrix and regression analysis are conducted using 
Eviews9, statistical program for econometric analysis.  
 
Correlation matrix 
 
The results of the correlation analysis are presented in Table 4. Pairwise correlation 
coefficients (Pearson) are calculated for the variables. Values for correlation coefficient 
can vary between -1 and 1. Two variables are perfectly positively correlated if the correlation 
coefficient is 1 and perfectly negatively correlated if the value is -1. If the correlation coefficient 
is 0, there is no correlation between the two variables (Heikkilä 2008: 90–91). Hence, the 
closer the value is to 1, the closer the two variables are to perfect collinearity. Table 4 
shows correlation coefficients and p-values for each pair. Probability values for each of 
the correlation coefficients are presented in parenthesis. P-values represent the level of 
significance for each of the outcomes.  
 
Table 4. Correlation matrix   
Variable ASSETS BSIZE BDIV ROA11 ROA16 ROE11 ROE16 
ASSETS 
 
1,000 
(–)       
BSIZE 
 
0,726 
(0,000)*** 
1,000 
(–)      
BDIV 
 
0,344 
(0,001)*** 
0,267 
(0,015)** 
1,000 
(–)     
ROA11 
 
-0,247 
(0,025)** 
-0,116 
(0,299) 
0,123 
(0,269) 
1,000 
(–)    
ROA16 
 
0,043 
(0,700) 
-0,011 
(0,920) 
0,217 
(0,050)* 
0,013 
(0,907) 
1,000 
(–)   
ROE11 
 
-0,162 
(0,146) 
-0,100 
(0,377) 
0,154 
(0,167) 
0,933 
(0,000)*** 
0,083 
(0,459) 
1,000 
(–)  
ROE16 
 
0,142 
(0,202) 
0,077 
(0,493) 
0,286 
(0,009)*** 
0,085 
(0,450) 
0,883 
(0,000)*** 
0,175 
(0,116) 
1,000 
(–) 
Note: P-values for each of the correlation coefficients in parenthesis below  
*** Statistical significance at the 0,01 level 
** Statistical significance at the 0,05 level 
* Statistical significance at the 0,10 level 
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As is seen in the correlation matrix, variables are either positively or negatively correlated 
with each other. This means, that when one variable changes, the corresponding variable 
changes in the same direction (positive correlation) or in the opposite direction (negative 
correlation). Control variables board size and assets are highly positively correlated 
(0,726) at the 0,01 level. Furthermore, as expected, ROA16 and ROE16, as well as 
ROA11 and ROE11 are highly positively correlated. This indicates that the values for 
these two performance measures increase or decrease simultaneously. The correlations 
for the performance measures are highly statistically significant. Thus, according to the 
results of the correlation matrix, better ROA is associated with better ROE. The results, 
however, do not explain the causality of these two variables.  
 
Multicollinearity problem is not present in the regression model, as the performance 
measures are used separately, i.e. one regression model for the relationship between ROA 
and BDIV and another model for ROE and BDIV. The only explanatory variable, BDIV, 
is not highly correlated with any of the variables.  
 
Board diversity is marginally positively correlated with assets and the p-value shows high 
statistical significance. Moreover, the results indicate positive and statistically significant 
correlation between BDIV and ROE16 (0,286, significance at 0,01% level). In addition, 
board diversity and ROA16 are positively correlated (0,217) at the 0,10% significance 
level. These results indicate that there is a positive and statistically significant correlation 
between firm financial performance and the number of women in the board of directors. 
Correlation between DIV, ROA11 and ROE11 remained positive but statistically 
insignificant. Board diversity is positively correlated with board size at the 0,05 level with 
p-value of 0,015. This indicates that larger boards of directors are also more diverse.  
 
Results from the correlation matrix are similar comparing to the findings of Erhardt et al. 
(2003) who also find highly significant positive correlation between performance 
measures (ROA and ROI) measured at time 2. Furthermore, Erhardt et al. (2003) find 
positive and statistically significant correlation between ROI at time 2 and board 
diversity. They report marginal positive correlation between board diversity and ROA. 
The results of the correlation matrix of this study support previous findings of Erhard et 
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al. (2003) according to which firm performance and board diversity are positively 
correlated and the study is compatible in both US and Finnish markets.  
 
Regression model 
 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) technique is used to estimate equation and test for the 
research hypothesis. The regression includes industry dummy for three industrial 
categories represented in the model as IND1 (Industrials), IND2 (goods & services) and 
IND3 (information technology). IND3 is the reference group in the estimation.  The 
relationship between explanatory variable (BDIV) and explained variables (ROA16; 
ROE16) are regressed separately. A t-test is performed and p-values for the test are 
reported in Table 5 and Table 6. Results of the hierarchical regression models are given 
in Tables 5–6. 
 
Results of the first regression model (dependent variable = ROA16) are presented in 
Table 5. In the estimated equation, regression coefficient (β) for board diversity is positive 
(12,604) and statistically significant at 0,10 level with p-value of 0,054 and t-value of 
1,955. The regression coefficient (β) describes the slope of the regression line. One unit 
increase in the explanatory variable results in (β) unit increase in the explained variable. 
Hence, when board diversity increases by one unit, firm ROA increases by 12,064 units. 
The results of the equation indicate that, after regressing board diversity on ROA16 and 
controlling for board size, natural logarithm of assets, ROA11 and adding industry 
dummy, diversity is positively related to firm financial performance.   
 
Other (control) variables are marginally correlated with ROA11 but the findings show no 
statistical significance. Board size is negatively associated with ROA16. ROA11 is also 
negatively associated with ROA16 and IND1 is negatively associated with ROA16. IND2 
and ASSETS is marginally positively associated with ROA16. The estimated equation 
has relatively small explanatory power (𝑅2) of 6,1 per cent. However, previous studies 
on gender diversity and firm performance report relatively small values for 𝑅2 or 
cumulative 𝑅2 (See e.g. Shrader et al. 1997; Erhardt et al. 2003). Although the goodness 
of fit value is small, the results of the estimated equation still show statistical significance 
57 
 
at 10 per cent level for explanatory variable (board diversity) and this model has some 
explanatory power. 
 
Table 5. Hierarchical regression summary: ROA 2016 estimates 
HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION SUMMARY    
ROA 2016 ESTIMATES (β) (t) p-value 
Constant 3,332 0,634 0,528 
Independent variable       
Board diversity (BDIV) 12,604 1,955 0,054* 
Control variables       
Board size (BSIZE) -0,52 -0,676 0,501 
Total assets (LNASSETS) 0,143 0,241 0,814 
Industrials (IND1) -1,156 -0,628 0,532 
Goods & Services (IND2) 0,058 0,028 0,978 
ROA11 -0,023 -0,251 0,802 
Estimated equation    
R^2 0,061     
AdjR^2 -0,014   
F-Stat 0,809   0,566  
 
*** Statistical significance at the 0,01 level 
** Statistical significance at the 0,05 level 
* Statistical significance at the 0,10 level 
 
    
    
Results of the second regression model (dependent variable = ROE16) are presented in 
Table 6. Results from the second equation follow a similar pattern as results from the first 
equation. Board diversity (BDIV) is positive and statistically significant at 0,05 level (t-
value 2,085). The regression coefficient (β) for board diversity is 26,218. In terms of 
ROE16, the results show that board diversity is positively and significantly associated 
with firm performance. When board diversity increases by one unit, firm ROE16 
increases by 26,218 units.  
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Board size is, again, negatively correlated with firm performance, although results show 
no statistical significance. This indicates that larger boards have a negative impact on firm 
performance.  Furthermore, as expected, assets are positively associated with ROE (no 
statistical significance). Industrial sector (IND1, IND2) is not statistically significantly 
associated with ROE16. The results for industry dummy, however, show that financial 
performance (ROE16), varies between different sectors as IND1 is negatively associated 
with performance whereas IND2 is positively associated with performance. The absolute 
value of the difference between IND1 and IND2 is 5,427 for ROE16 and for ROA16 it is 
1,214. The explanatory power (𝑅2) of the second equation is greater than that of the first 
equation (0,135) and F-stat (1,950) show statistical significance at 0,10 level (0,084).  
 
Table 6. Hierarchical regression summary: ROE 2016 estimates 
HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION SUMMARY    
ROE 2016 ESTIMATES (β) (t) p-value 
Constant -7,388 -0,743 0,460 
Independent variable       
Board diversity (BDIV) 26,218 2,085 0,041** 
Control variables       
Board size (BSIZE) -0,431 -0,287 0,775 
Total assets (LNASSETS) 0,775 0,679 0,499 
Industrials (IND1) -0,749 -0,210 0,834 
Goods & Services (IND2) 4,678 1,146 0,256 
ROA11 0,133 1,389 0,169 
Estimated equation    
R^2 0,135     
AdjR^2 0,066   
F-Stat 1,950   0,084* 
 
*** Statistical significance at the 0,01 level 
** Statistical significance at the 0,05 level 
* Statistical significance at the 0,10 level 
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Research hypothesis H0 and H1 were presented in chapter 1.1. After estimating two 
regression models for ROA16 and ROE16 and analyzing the results, null hypothesis (H0) 
is rejected and alternative hypothesis (H1) accepted for the two-side test.  The findings of 
the two regression models support the assumption, according to which gender diversity 
in the board of directors is positively related to firm financial performance. This finding 
is in in line with the studies of Erhardt et al. (2003) and Carter et al. (2003) who report 
positive association between women in the boardroom and firm financial performance.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This paper investigated the relationship between gender diversity in the boardroom and 
firm financial performance within Nasdaq OMX Helsinki firms. The study was conducted 
by examining financial performance of a cross-sectional data set of 82 Finnish publicly 
listed companies and gender diversity in the board of directors of these companies with a 
set of control variables. The data set was analyzed through a correlation matrix and OLS 
regression model.  
 
The empirical findings of this study support the original assumption of this research that 
number of women in the board of directors is positively associated with financial 
performance. The relationship between board diversity, ROA and ROE was positive and 
statistically significant at 0,10- and 0,05 levels, respectively. Other relationships between 
research variables remained statistically insignificant. Indeed, the number of female 
directors seems to have a positive impact on organizational performance. This is in line 
with previous findings from US and European markets (See e.g. Erhardt et al. 2003; Rose 
2007).  
 
There are few limitations in the technique used in this paper. The regression model of this 
paper does not measure behavioral differences of the two genders and by looking at this 
paper alone, it is impossible to determine, if the behavior of diverse boards differs from 
more homogenous boards. Furthermore, the data set of 82 firms is relatively small and it 
only contains large, publicly listed firms. More studies on different, more heterogeneous 
group of firms need to be conducted in order to make a more accurate statement that 
female directors indeed have a positive impact on firm performance. The empirical 
findings of this study are based on latest financial data. Since data regarding gender 
representation within the board of directors of the Finnish firms was not easily achievable, 
this study does not take into consideration the past increase in gender diversity in the 
boardroom of these firms. It would be interesting to study further, how the changes in the 
number of female directors affect financial performance by constructing a panel data set 
of the same 82 firms at different points in time.  
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An important notation of the limitations of this and other similar studies on diversity and 
firm performance, is that the relationship between gender diversity and performance is 
linear. The data set of 82 companies is rather small and the restrictions of the data made 
it impossible to determine how diversity affected firm performance. According to the 
results, an increase in diversity ratio results in (β) increase in firm performance and stays 
the same (linear regression). In the model, this increase is described by the regression 
coefficient (β).  Similar notation was pointed out by Erhardt et al. (2003), who speculated 
that, by adding more data to their research, the relationship between diversity and 
performance could turn more “curvilinear”. This means, that after reaching a certain level 
in organizational diversity, the additional increase in the number of women (minorities) 
within the board of directors would lead to an increase in firm performance with 
decreasing rate. Thus, the benefit from adding a new female board member would 
increase but with a decreasing pace and will eventually diminish close to zero.  
 
All in all, the findings of this study are interesting and provide useful information for 
government and other regulatory agencies as well as companies about the advantages of 
hiring women in top management positions and corporate boards. Female workforce are 
often disregarded as potential candidates for top positions. However, the findings of latest 
research suggest that gender diversity is advantageous for companies. Female board 
members are beneficial for companies and the presence of women in the boardroom 
seems to, at least to some extent, improve financial performance.  
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APPENDIX 1. Companies, descriptive statistics. 
 
COMPANY BSIZE MEN WOMEN ROA_2011 ROE_2011 ROA_2016 ROE_2016 ASSETS 
Affecto Oyj 6 4 2 3.672 8.857 4.020 7.365 117454 
Ahlstrom Oyj 7 6 1 0.435 1.425 3.633 9.847 1186500 
Aktia Bank Abp 9 5 4 0.257 6.820 0.520 8.042 9485978 
Alma Media Oyj 7 5 2 14.848 31.343 5.168 12.246 327000 
Amer Sports Oyj 8 6 2 4.994 10.982 4.674 12.651 2715100 
Apetit Oyj 6 6 0 3.068 4.176 0.653 1.020 183700 
Aspo Oyj 6 4 2 4.944 14.485 5.119 13.843 309736 
Aspocomp Group Oyj 4 2 2 44.192 71.727 6.568 9.719 15744 
Atria Oyj 8 7 1 -0.624 -1.591 2.000 4.309 909441 
Biohit Oyj 6 5 1 52.762 71.358 -25.368 -30.651 12989 
Bittium Oyj 5 4 1 -4.624 -7.946 2.286 2.683 153292 
CapMan Oyj 5 4 1 7.649 12.351 6.049 10.691 252694 
Cargotec Oyj 6 5 1 4.763 12.667 3.372 9.018 3736300 
Comptel Oyj 5 4 1 10.167 17.452 12.286 25.878 94886 
Cramo Oyj 7 5 2 2.086 4.750 5.933 13.195 1155758 
Dovre Group Oyj 4 4 0 9.493 15.682 -3.900 -6.465 42794 
Elecster Oyj 3 2 1 4.649 11.197 6.269 12.472 50328 
Elisa Oyj 7 4 3 10.073 24.068 10.150 26.470 2533000 
Etteplan Oyj 6 5 1 7.109 22.769 5.654 14.406 134483 
Evli Pankki Oyj 7 6 1 0.652 7.496 1.285 14.859 755010 
Finnair Oyj 7 4 3 -3.721 -11.665 3.365 9.930 2528700 
Fiskars Oyj Abp 10 6 4 16.624 28.198 3.642 5.254 1760100 
Fortum Oyj 8 5 3 7.692 18.366 2.258 3.663 21964000 
F-Secure Oyj 7 6 1 13.027 27.488 9.069 20.077 168064 
Glaston Oyj Abp 7 5 2 -7.710 -27.326 1.014 2.856 101053 
HKScan Oyj 5 3 2 0.806 2.468 -0.632 -1.318 854800 
Honkarakenne Oyj 6 4 2 2.472 5.403 -7.195 -21.488 19945 
Huhtamäki Oyj 7 5 2 4.619 11.277 6.662 16.199 2874600 
Ilkka-Yhtymä Oyj 6 4 2 6.434 12.136 4.928 8.909 125950 
Innofactor Oyj 5 5 0 3.749 5.324 2.416 6.826 63587 
Investors House Oyj 4 4 0 -1.629 -2.027 8.642 17.363 43589 
Kemira Oyj 7 4 3 5.242 10.328 3.503 7.761 2620900 
Keskisuomalainen Oyj 8 7 1 12.880 25.098 4.425 10.834 178615 
Kesko Oyj 7 5 2 4.332 8.346 2.237 4.637 4407700 
Kesla Oyj 5 4 1 6.560 15.050 1.111 3.327 32842 
KONE Oyj 8 5 3 13.615 31.756 12.875 36.618 7951300 
Konecranes Abp 6 5 1 4.527 15.114 2.458 8.440 1529900 
Lassila & Tikanoja Oyj 6 5 1 3.431 7.792 9.585 19.462 452800 
Lemminkäinen Oyj 7 5 2 2.794 9.957 3.926 11.387 968000 
Marimekko Oyj 6 4 2 5.817 8.652 8.317 14.243 48493 
Martela Oyj 7 4 3 2.247 5.092 5.896 13.172 56238 
Metso Oyj 8 6 2 5.379 16.832 4.017 9.034 3236000 
Metsä Board Oyj 9 7 2 -10.156 -37.295 4.120 8.589 2194200 
Neste Oyj 7 4 3 2.173 6.441 12.616 25.007 7443000 
Nokia Oyj 9 7 2 -5.005 -15.262 -1.706 -3.652 44901000 
Nokian Renkaat Oyj 7 4 3 16.467 26.050 12.745 17.264 1975700 
Nurminen Logistics Oyj 5 5 0 -3.544 -9.177 -8.018 -54.937 43854 
Olvi Oyj 5 3 2 5.326 10.645 9.983 16.111 328505 
Orion Oyj 7 5 2 26.903 41.920 23.426 38.821 1062900 
Outokumpu Oyj 9 6 3 -3.329 -8.546 2.404 5.960 5990000 
Outotec Oyj 8 6 2 5.579 19.905 -4.856 -13.913 1427000 
Panostaja Oyj 6 5 1 0.658 2.829 4.924 12.961 187279 
Pohjois-Karjalan Kirjapaino Oyj 7 6 1 5.522 11.302 15.635 22.511 78963 
Ponsse Oyj 6 5 1 8.516 18.854 15.156 30.516 301600 
Pöyry Oyj 6 5 1 1.216 4.338 -2.963 -10.566 421800 
QPR Software Oyj 4 3 1 6.829 17.779 7.216 17.466 7871 
Raisio Oyj 5 4 1 4.592 7.776 4.043 6.066 470000 
Ramirent Oyj 7 5 2 5.583 13.721 2.660 7.420 830054 
Rapala VMC Oyj 6 5 1 4.452 10.886 -0.949 -2.204 316100 
Raute Oyj 6 5 1 -2.079 -4.962 9.580 19.534 69767 
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Restamax Oyj 6 6 0 12.945 37.037 5.742 12.756 97666 
Revenio Group Oyj 5 4 1 15.797 23.808 29.428 37.304 18975 
Saga Furs Oyj 8 7 1 11.577 20.516 -1.124 -2.754 216955 
Sampo Oyj 8 5 3 3.448 11.637 4.347 13.826 37955000 
Sanoma Oyj 10 6 4 1.952 6.739 4.252 11.052 2605600 
Scanfil Oyj 5 4 1 4.852 9.058 0.034 0.085 266768 
Solteq Oyj 6 4 2 5.163 15.088 7.532 22.705 61232 
Soprano Oyj 4 3 1 4.521 7.341 3.803 9.661 12281 
Sponda Oyj 8 5 3 3.478 9.207 3.513 7.438 3916500 
SRV Yhtiöt Oyj 6 5 1 0.996 3.527 1.571 4.695 882486 
Suominen Oyj 6 4 2 -2.819 -8.765 4.826 10.666 315628 
Technopolis Oyj 6 5 1 4.850 14.150 2.591 6.280 1825123 
Teleste Oyj 6 5 1 4.729 11.525 7.291 14.001 162112 
Tikkurila Oyj 6 3 3 8.167 18.531 10.836 21.317 410338 
Tulikivi Oyj 5 5 0 -4.295 -12.923 -5.697 -17.198 37422 
UPM-Kymmene Oyj 10 7 3 2.970 6.125 6.319 10.670 13911000 
Vaisala Oyj 7 5 2 4.147 5.699 7.373 10.532 255000 
Valmet Oyj 8 5 3 3.277 26.406 2.806 9.368 2958000 
Viking Line Abp 7 6 1 2.125 4.570 1.581 3.589 506000 
Wulff-Yhtiöt Oyj 4 3 1 1.425 3.963 1.184 2.487 25432 
YIT Oyj 5 3 2 3.550 13.506 -0.311 -1.259 2284000 
Yleiselektroniikka Oyj 5 3 2 8.602 15.133 7.988 12.422 18040 
 
 
